 The Jean Monnet Program
Professor J.H.H. Weiler
European Union Jean Monnet Chair
in cooperation with the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs at Princeton University
Provost Christopher L. Eisgruber
Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs
Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual
Perspective
Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04
Wolfgang Wessels
A ‘Saut constitutionnel’ out of an intergovernmental trap? The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty for the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
Papers included in this collection should be cited according to the following format.
Wolfgang Wessels, A ‘Saut constitutionnel’ out of an intergovernmental trap?
The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty for the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, in Weiler and Eisgruber, eds., Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, [http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-17.html]
All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the author.
ISSN 1087-2221
© Wolfgang Wessels 2004
New York University School of Law and
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University
W olfgang Wessels
Jean Monnet Chair, Universität zu Köln
TEPSA
A ‘Saut constitutionnel’ out of an intergovernmental trap?
The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty
for the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
Contribution to:
Altneuland: The Constitution of Europe in an American Perspective
Table of Contents
Papers included in this collection should be cited according to the following format. 2
Abstract: 10 Theses 4
1. The challenge: analysis and assessment of a constitutional cornerstone sui generis 6
2. Expectations and capabilities 8
2.1. Ambitious objectives: towards a dual identity 8
2.2. Modest allocation of instruments: limited transfers of capabilities 10
2.3. Systematic cooperation through self-imposed obligations: more than constitutional prose? 11
3. Procedures and Institutions 13
3.1. Decision making rules: marginal reformulations 13
3.1.2 Permanent structured cooperation: more opportunities – unclear incentives 15
3.2. The institutional architecture: towards personalisation and politicisation 17
3.2.1 Familiar trends 17
3.2.2. The Union Minister of Foreign Affairs: high on expectation – low on powers 19
4. Conclusions: a mixed assessment 26
4.1. An exit from the intergovernmental trap ? 26
List of Graphs
Graph 1: The Institutional architecture of TCE…………………………………………..17
Bibliography...........................................................................................................................32
Abbreviations
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
Coreper - Comité des Représentants Permanents - Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
EC - European Community
ECB - European Central Bank
ECJ - European Court of Justice
EDC - European Defence Community
EMU - Economic and Monetary Union
EP - European Parliament
EPC - European Political Cooperation
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
EU - European Union
EUMS - European Military Staff
IGC - Intergovernmental Conference
JCMS - Journal of Common Market Studies
OJ - Official Journal of the European Union
PPEWU - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC - Political and Security Committee
QMV - Qualified Majority Voting
SEA - Single European Act
TCE - Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
TEPSA - Trans European Policy Studies Association
TEU - Treaty of the European Union
TEU MV - Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Version)
TEU AV - Treaty of the European Union (Amsterdam Version)
TEU NV - Treaty of the European Union (Nice Version)
UMFA - Union Minister for Foreign Affairs
WEU - Western European Union
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
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