
The Jean Monnet Program Professor J.H.H. Weiler European Union Jean Monnet Chair
in cooperation with the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University Provost Christopher L. Eisgruber Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs
Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective
Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04
Wolfgang Wessels A ‘Saut constitutionnel’ out of an intergovernmental trap? The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty for the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
Papers included in this collection should be cited according to the following format. Wolfgang Wessels, A ‘Saut constitutionnel’ out of an intergovernmental trap? The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty for the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, in Weiler and Eisgruber, eds., Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, [http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-17.html]
All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author.
ISSN 1087-2221 © Wolfgang Wessels 2004 New York University School of Law and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University W olfgang Wessels Jean Monnet Chair, Universität zu Köln TEPSA
A ‘Saut constitutionnel’ out of an intergovernmental trap? The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty for the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
Contribution to: Altneuland: The Constitution of Europe in an American Perspective
Table of Contents Papers included in this collection should be cited according to the following format. 2 Abstract: 10 Theses 4 1. The challenge: analysis and assessment of a constitutional cornerstone sui generis 6 2. Expectations and capabilities 8 2.1. Ambitious objectives: towards a dual identity 8 2.2. Modest allocation of instruments: limited transfers of capabilities 10 2.3. Systematic cooperation through self-imposed obligations: more than constitutional prose? 11 3. Procedures and Institutions 13 3.1. Decision making rules: marginal reformulations 13 3.1.2 Permanent structured cooperation: more opportunities – unclear incentives 15 3.2. The institutional architecture: towards personalisation and politicisation 17 3.2.1 Familiar trends 17 3.2.2. The Union Minister of Foreign Affairs: high on expectation – low on powers 19 4. Conclusions: a mixed assessment 26 4.1. An exit from the intergovernmental trap ? 26 List of Graphs Graph 1: The Institutional architecture of TCE…………………………………………..17
Bibliography...........................................................................................................................32 Abbreviations
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy Coreper - Comité des Représentants Permanents - Committee of Permanent Representatives CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy EC - European Community ECB - European Central Bank ECJ - European Court of Justice EDC - European Defence Community EMU - Economic and Monetary Union EP - European Parliament EPC - European Political Cooperation ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy EU - European Union EUMS - European Military Staff IGC - Intergovernmental Conference JCMS - Journal of Common Market Studies OJ - Official Journal of the European Union PPEWU - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PSC - Political and Security Committee QMV - Qualified Majority Voting SEA - Single European Act TCE - Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe TEPSA - Trans European Policy Studies Association TEU - Treaty of the European Union TEU MV - Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Version) TEU AV - Treaty of the European Union (Amsterdam Version) TEU NV - Treaty of the European Union (Nice Version) UMFA - Union Minister for Foreign Affairs WEU - Western European Union NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe |