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Hegemony Disad 1
1NC Hegemony DA [1/5] 3
1NC Hegemony DA [2/5] 4
1NC Hegemony DA [3/5] 5
1NC Hegemony DA [4/5] 6
1NC Hegemony DA [5/5] 7
UQ – No Balancing 8
UQ – No Balancing – Asia 9
UQ – No Balancing – East Asia/AT: China 10
UQ – No Balancing – Structural Barriers 11
UQ – No Balancing – No Challengers ** [1/3] 12
UQ – No Balancing – Empirics 15
UQ – No Balancing – Costs 16
UQ – No Balancing – AT: Backlash 17
UQ – Yes Bandwagoning – Middle East 18
UQ – Yes Bandwagoning – Asia 19
UQ – Yes Bandwagoning – Europe 20
UQ – Heg High 21
UQ – Heg High 22
UQ – Heg Sustainable –Ambition/No Challengers 23
UQ – Heg Sustainable – Interdependence 24
UQ – Heg Sustainable – AT: Iraq Overstretch 25
Link – Withdrawal 26
Link – Withdrawal 27
Link – Afghanistan 28
Link – East Asia 29
Link – Japan 30
UQ – Balancing Inevitable ** 31
UQ – Balancing Inev 32
UQ – Balancing Now ** [1/2] 33
UQ – Balancing Now 35
UQ – Yes Balancing 36
UQ – Yes Balancing – East Asia 37
UQ – Yes Balancing – China 38
UQ – Yes Balancing – China 39
UQ – Yes Balancing – China 40
UQ – Yes Balancing – China 41
UQ – Yes Balancing – Russia 42
UQ – No Balancing – Middle Powers 43
UQ – Yes Balancing – AT: Brooks and Wohlforth 44
UQ – Yes Balancing – AT: Brooks and Wohlforth 45
UQ – Collapse Inev 46
UQ – Collapse Inev – Economy/GDP 47
UQ – Collapse Inev – Economy/Competitiveness 49
UQ – Collapse Inev – Balancing 50
UQ – No Bandwagoning 51
Impact – OSB Good – Challengers 53
Impact – OSB Good – Balancing/Wedge Strategy 54
Impact – OSB Good – Iran War 56
Impact – OSB Good – Iraq Stability 57
Impact – OSB Good – Afghanistan Stability 59
Impact – OSB Good – Afghanistan Stability 61
Impact – OSB Good – Terrorism 63
Impact – OSB Good – Israel/Palestine War 65
Impact – OSB Good – Middle East Stability 66
Impact – OSB Good – Middle East Stability 67
Impact – OSB Good – East Asia Stability 68
Impact – OSB Good – Central Asia Stability 69
Impact – OSB Good – China 70
Impact – OSB Good – China 71
Impact – OSB Good – AT: Redeployment** 72
Impact – Multipolarity Good – East Asia Stability 73
Impact – Forward Deployment Bad – GPW 75
Impact – Forward Deployment Bad – GPW 76
Impact – Forward Deployment Bad – Challengers [1/2] 77
Impact – Forward Deployment Bad – ME – Terrorism 79
Impact – Forward Deployment Bad – ME – AT: Oil 80
Impact – AT: Kagan 82
Smart Power Good – Selective Engagement 83
Smart Power Good – Legitimacy 84
Collective Security Good – Laundry List 85
Selective Engagement Good – Power Projection [1/2] 86
Selective Engagement Good – China 88
Non-Interventionism Good – Flexibility 89
1NC Hegemony DA [1/5]
A. Uniqueness – U.S. military primacy is high – aggressive force posture makes it sustainable, and there are no challengers
Brooks and Wohlforth 2008 [Stephen G. and William C., Profs. Gov’t @ Dartmouth, World out of Balance, p. 28-9]
These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest US forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” –that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it,
“Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.
1NC Hegemony DA [2/5]
B. Link – Withdrawal creates immediate regional power vacuums that embolden challengers.
Poffenbarger and Schaefer 2009 [John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP]
It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.
1NC Hegemony DA [3/5]
C. Impact – Sustained unipolar hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict – we must stay the course.
Kagan 2007 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Hoover Institution - Stanford U, in Policy Review, No 144, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]
Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.
The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.
It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.
Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.
People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by
1NC Hegemony DA [4/5]
configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the
world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.
The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.
Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.
In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.
It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.
The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and
1NC Hegemony DA [5/5]
Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the
region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.
The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
UQ – No Balancing
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