Wy, it's just ez clear ez Aggers, Clear ez one an' one make two, Chaps thet make black slaves o' niggers, Want to make wite slaves o' you




НазваниеWy, it's just ez clear ez Aggers, Clear ez one an' one make two, Chaps thet make black slaves o' niggers, Want to make wite slaves o' you
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Siege of Vicksburg

southern hands (see Map 15.2). After months of searching through swamps and bayous, General Ulysses S. Grant found an advantageous ap­proach to the city. He laid siege to Vicksburg in May, bottling up the defending army of General John Pemberton. If Vicksburg fell, Union forces would control the river, cutting the Confeder­acy in two and gaining an open path into its interior. To stave off such a result, Jefferson Davis gave com­mand of all other forces in the area to General Joseph E. Johnston and beseeched him to go to Pemberton's aid. Meanwhile, at a council of war in Richmond, General Robert E. Lee proposed a Confederate inva­sion of the North. Although such an offensive would not relieve Vicksburg directly, it could stun and dismay the North and, if successful, possibly even lead to peace. By invading the North a second time, Lee hoped to take the war out of war-weary Virginia, gar­ner civilian support in Maryland, win a major victory on northern soil, threaten major cities, and thereby force a Union capitulation on his terms.

Lee's troops streamed through western Maryland and into Pennsylvania, threatening both Washington and Baltimore. As his emboldened army advanced, the possibility of a major battle near the Union capital be­came more and more likely. Confederate prospects along the Mississippi, however, darkened. Davis re­peatedly wired General Johnston, urging him to con­centrate his forces and attack Grant's army. Johnston, however, did little, telegraphing back, "I consider sav­ing Vicksburg hopeless." Grant's men, meanwhile, were supplying themselves from the abundant crops of the Mississippi River valley and could continue their siege indefinitely. Their rich meat-and-vegetables diet became so tiresome, in fact, that one day, as Grant rode by, a private looked up and muttered, "Hard­tack," referring to the dry biscuits that were the usual staple of soldiers' diets. Soon a line of soldiers was shouting "Hardtack! Hardtack!" demanding respite from turkey and sweet potatoes.

In such circumstances the fall of Vicksburg was in­evitable, and on July 4, 1863, its commander surren­dered. The same day a battle that had * been raging for three days concluded at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (see Map 15.3). On July 1 Confederate forces hunting for a supply of shoes had collided with part of the Union Army. Heavy fighting on the second day over two steep hills left fed­eral forces in possession of high ground along

Battle of Gettysburg

Chapter 15 Transforming Fire: The Civil War, 1861-1865

^Ibemarle Sound Feb. 1862

Roanoke I. uFeb. 1862

New Bern *^TjL , > Mar. 1862 Cape Hatteras

f \ Aug. 1861

Pamlico Sound Feb. 1862

\TI ANTIC

OCEAN

*-Union

<-Confederate

% Union victory % Confederate victory I I Union gains, 1861-1862

Map 15.2 War in the West, 1861-1863 Here is an overview of the Union's successful cam­paigns in the west and its seizure of key points on the Mississippi River, as well as along the Atlantic coast in 1862 and 1863. These actions were decisive in paving the way for ultimate northern victory.

Cemetery Ridge, running more than a mile south of the town. There they enjoyed the protection of a stone wall and a clear view of their foe across almost a mile of open field.

Undaunted, Lee believed his reinforced troops could break the Union line, and on July 3 he ordered a direct assault. Full of foreboding, General James Longstreet warned Lee that "no 15,000 men ever ar­rayed for battle can take that position." But Lee stuck to his plan. Virginians under General George E. Pick­ett and North Carolinians under General James Petti-grew methodically marched up the slope in a doomed assault known as Pickett's Charge. For a moment a few hundred Confederates breached the enemy's line, but most fell in heavy slaughter. On July 4 Lee had to withdraw, having suffered almost 4,000 dead and about 24,000 missing and wounded. The Confederate general reported to President Davis that "I am alone to blame" and offered to resign. Davis replied that to find a more capable commander was "an impossibility."

The Confederacy had reached what many consider its "high water mark" on that ridge at Gettysburg.

Southern troops displayed unforgettable courage and dedication at Gettysburg, and the Union Army, which suffered 23,000 casualties (nearly one-quarter of the force), under General George G. Meade exhibited the same bravery in stopping the Confederate inva­sion. But the results there and at Vicksburg were disas­trous for the South. The Confederacy was split in two; west of the Mississippi General E. Kirby Smith had to operate on his own, virtually independent of Rich­mond. Moreover, the heartland of Louisiana, Ten­nessee, and Mississippi lay exposed to invasion, and Lee's defeat spelled the end of major southern offen­sive actions. Too weak to prevail in attack, the Confed­eracy henceforth would have to conserve its limited resources and rely on a prolonged defense. By refusing to be beaten, and wearing down northern morale, the South might yet win, but its prospects were darker than ever before.

Disunity, South and North

Map 15.3 Battle of Gettysburg In the war's greatest battle, fought around a small market town in southern Pennsylvania, Lee's invasion of the North was repulsed. Union forces had the advantage of high ground, shorter lines, and superior numbers. The casualties for the two armies—dead, wounded, and missing—exceeded 50,000 men.

Disunity, South and North

Both northern and southern governments waged the final two years of the war in the face of increasing opposition at home. Dissatisfactions that had surfaced earlier grew more intense and sometimes violent. The gigan­tic costs of a civil war that neither side seemed able to win fed the unrest. But protest also arose from funda­mental stresses in the social structures of North and South.

The Confederacy's problems were both more seri­ous and more deeply rooted than the North's. Vastly disadvantaged in industrial capacity, natural resources,

\. and labor, southerners felt the cost of Disintegration , . . ,, ,. ,

« o *La t tne war more quickly, more directly, of Confederate , . r , ,

and more painfully than northerners.

But even more fundamental were the Confederacy's internal problems; crises that were integrally connected with the southern class system threatened the Confederate cause.

One ominous development was the planters' in­creasing opposition to their own government. Not only did the Richmond government impose new taxes and the tax-in-kind, but Confederate military authori­ties also impressed slaves to build fortifications. And when Union forces advanced on plantation areas, Confederate commanders burned stores of cotton that lay in the enemy's path. Such interference with planta­tion routines and financial interests was not what planters had expected of their government, and they complained bitterly.

Nor were the centralizing policies of the Davis ad­ministration popular. The increasing size and power of the Richmond government startled and alarmed planters who had condemned federal usurpations. In fact, the Confederate constitution had granted sub­stantial powers to the central government, especially in time of war. But many planters assumed with R. B. Rhett, editor of the Charleston Mercury, that the Con­federate constitution "leaves the States untouched in their Sovereignty, and commits to the Confederate Government only a few simple objects, and a few sim­ple powers to enforce them." Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia took a similarly inflated view of the importance of the states. During the brief interval between Georgia's secession from the Union and its admission to the Confederacy, Brown sent an ambas­sador to Europe to seek recognition for the sovereign republic of Georgia from Queen Victoria, Napoleon III, and the king of Belgium.

Years of opposition to the federal government within the Union had frozen southerners in a defen­sive posture. Now they erected the barrier of states' rights as a defense against change, hiding behind it while their capacity for creative statesmanship atro­phied. Planters sought, above all, a guarantee that their plantations and their lives would remain un­touched; many were not deeply committed either to building a southern nation or to winning indepen­dence. If the Confederacy had been allowed to depart from the Union in peace and continue as a semidevel-oped cotton-growing region, they would have been content. When secession revolutionized their world, they could not or would not adjust.

Chapter 15 Transforming Fire: The Civil War, 1861-1865

Who is He 7—On the field of Gettys­burg, after the batt>s, the dead body of a Union soldier wa* fjund, holding is big clasp­ed, hands an ambrotype picture of three chil­dren, a girl and two boys, aged apparently about nine, seven and five years. ,In the pic-, ture, the youngest child, a boy, is seated in a] high chair, between his elder brother and his] sister, while the dresses of the two latter are] made of the same material. Thqhaoldier was buried on toe-field where he fell, and his gravel is marked, but his name could not be ascer-; taincd. It is hoped, however, that he may yet: be identified by means of the ambrotype of I the children found in his hands wbea his body! was discovered. The picture is now in posses­sion of Dr. Bourns, llO«£Sprin

These "children of the battlefield" aroused great interest in the North after a burial detail at Gettysburg found this ambrotype clutched in the hand of a fallen Union soldier. Af­ter thousands of copies of the picture were circulated, the wife of Sergeant Amos Humiston of the 154th New York In­fantry (above) recognized her children and knew that she was a widow. (The C. Craig Caba Gettysburg Collection, from Gettysburg. Larry Sherer© 1991 Time-Life Books, Inc.)

Confused and embittered planters struck out at Jefferson Davis. Conscription, thundered Governor Brown, was "subversive of [Georgia's] sovereignty, and at war with all the principles for the support of which Georgia entered into this revolution." Searching for ways to frustrate the law, Brown bickered over draft exemptions and ordered local enrollment officials not to cooperate with the Confederacy. The Charleston Mercury told readers that "conscription . . . is . . . the very embodiment of Lincolnism, which our gallant armies are today fighting." In a gesture of stubborn selfishness, Robert Toombs of Georgia, a former U.S. senator, refused to switch from cotton to food crops, defying the wishes of the government, the newspapers, and his neighbors' petitions. His action bespoke the inflexibility of the southern elite at a crucial point in the Confederacy's struggle to survive.

The southern courts ultimately upheld Davis's power to conscript. Despite his cold formality and in­ability to disarm critics, Davis possessed two impor­tant virtues: iron determination and total dedication to independence. These qualities kept the Confederacy afloat. But his actions earned him the hatred of most influential and elite citizens.

Meanwhile, for ordinary southerners, the dire pre­dictions of hunger and suffering were becoming a real­ity. Food riots occurred in the spring of 1863 in Atlanta, Macon, Colum-

Food Riots in Southern Cities

bus, and Augusta, Georgia, and in Salisbury and High Point, North Carolina. On April 2 a crowd assem­bled in Richmond to demand relief. A passerby, notic­ing the excitement, asked a young girl, "Is there some celebration?" "We celebrate our right to live," replied the girl. "We are starving. As soon as enough of us get together we are going to the bakeries and each of us will take a loaf of bread." Soon they did just that, spark­ing a riot that Davis himself had to quell at gunpoint.

Throughout the rural South, ordinary people re­sisted more quietly—by refusing to cooperate with conscription, tax collection, and impressments of food. "In all the States impressments are evaded by every

Disunity, South and North

means which ingenuity can suggest, and in some openly resisted," wrote a high-ranking commissary of­ficer. Farmers who did provide food for the army re­fused to accept payment in certificates of credit or government bonds, as required by law. Conscription officers increasingly found no one to draft—men of draft age were hiding out in the forests. "The disposi­tion to avoid military service is general," observed one of Georgia's senators in 1864. In some areas tax agents were killed in the line of duty.

Jefferson Davis was ill equipped to deal with such discontent. Austere and private by nature, he failed to communicate with the masses. Often he buried him­self in military affairs or administrative details. His class perspective also distanced him from the suffer­ings of the common people. While his social circle in Richmond dined on duck and oysters, ordinary south­erners recovered salt from the drippings on their smokehouse floors and went hungry. State governors who responded to people's needs won the public's loy­alty, but Davis failed to reach out to the plain folk and thus lost their support.

Such discontent was certain to affect the Confed­erate armies. "What man is there that would stay in the army and no that his family is

TTmnrmmm7mmmm sufring at home?" an angry citizen Desertions from 5 , ,r

*u p « a + wrote anonymously to the secretary ine iionfeQerate r Tir i i i i 1

. of war. Worried about their loved

ones and resentful of what they saw as a rich man's war, large numbers of men did indeed leave the armies. Their friends and neighbors gave them support. Mary Boykin Chesnut observed a man being dragged back to the army as his wife looked on. "Desert agin, Jake!" she cried openly. "You desert agin, quick as you kin. Come back to your wife and children."

Desertion did not become a serious problem for the Confederacy until mid-1862, and stiffer policing solved the problem that year. But from 1863 on, the number of men on duty fell rapidly as desertions soared. By mid-1863, John A. Campbell, the South's assistant secretary of war, wondered whether "so gen­eral a habit" as desertion could be considered a crime. Campbell estimated that 40,000 to 50,000 troops were absent without leave and that 100,000 were evading duty in some way. Furloughs, amnesty proclamations, and appeals to return had little effect; by November 1863 Secretary of War James Seddon admitted that one-third of the army could not be accounted for. The situation would worsen.

The defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg dealt a heavy blow to Confederate morale. When the news

The impoverishment of nonslaveholding white families was a critical problem for the Confederacy. The sale of this sheet music was intended not only to boost morale but also to raise money that could be used to aid the hun­gry and needy. This effort and larger government initia­tives, however, failed to solve the problem. (Chicago Historical Society)

reached Josiah Gorgas, the genius of Confederate ord­nance operations, he confided to his diary, "Today ab­solute ruin seems our portion. The Confederacy totters to its destruction." In desperation President Davis and several state governors resorted to threats and racial scare tactics to drive southern whites to fur­ther sacrifice. Defeat, Davis warned, would mean "ex­termination of yourselves, your wives, and children." Governor Charles Clark of Mississippi predicted "ele­vation of the black race to a position of equality—aye, of superiority, that will make them your masters and rulers."

From this point on, the internal disintegration of the Confederacy quickened. A few newspapers began to call openly for peace. "We are for peace," admitted the Raleigh (North Carolina) Daily Progress, "because there has been enough of blood and carnage, enough of widows and orphans." A neighboring journal, the North Carolina Standard, tacitly admitted that defeat was inevitable and called for negotiations. Similar pro­posals were made in several state legislatures, though they were presented as plans for independence on

Chapter 15 Transforming Fire: The Civil War, 1861-1865

honorable terms. Confederate leaders began to realize that they were losing the support of the common people. Governor Zebulon Vance of North Carolina wrote privately that victory would require more "blood and misery . . . and our people will not pay this price I am satisfied for their independence."

In North Carolina a peace movement grew under the leadership of William W. Holden, a popular Dem­ocratic politician and editor. Over

_J "|; ~_rr,IT[mrri one hundred public meetings took
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