Wy, it's just ez clear ez Aggers, Clear ez one an' one make two, Chaps thet make black slaves o' niggers, Want to make wite slaves o' you




НазваниеWy, it's just ez clear ez Aggers, Clear ez one an' one make two, Chaps thet make black slaves o' niggers, Want to make wite slaves o' you
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Figure 15.1 Comparative Resources, Union and Confederate States, 1861 The North had vastly superior resources. Although the North's advantages in manpower and industrial capacity proved very important, the South still had to be conquered, its society and its will crushed. (Source: The Times Atlas of World History. Time Books, London, 1978. Used with permission.)

g Union States jj| Confederate States

Total Population, 2.5 to 1 Naval Ship Tonnage, 25 to 1 Farm Acreage, 3 to 1

Free Men 18-60 Yrs., 4.4 to 1 Factory Production Value, 10 to 1 Draft Animals, 1.8 to 1

Free Men in Military Service, 1864 Textile Goods Production, 14 to 1 Railroad Mileage, 2.4 to 1

Chapter 15 Transforming Fire: The Civil War, 1861-1865

wage a war against slavery, the federal government did not acknowledge the slaves' freedom—though it began to use their labor in the Union cause. This swelling tide of emancipated slaves, defined by many Union officers as "contraband" of war (confiscated enemy property), forced first a bitter and confused debate within the Union Army and government over how to treat the freedmen, and then a forthright attempt to harness their power.

The coastal incursions worried southerners, but the spring of 1862 brought even stronger evidence of the war's gravity. In March two ironclad ships—the Monitor (a Union warship) and the Merrimack (a Union ship recycled by the Confederacy)—fought each other for the first time; their battle, though inde­cisive, ushered in a new era in naval design. In April Union ships commanded by Admiral David Farragut smashed through log booms blocking the Mississippi River and fought their way upstream to capture New Orleans. Farther west three full Confederate regi­ments were organized, mostly of Cherokees, from In­dian Territory, but a Union victory at Elkhorn Tavern, Arkansas, shattered southern control of Indian Terri­tory. Thereafter, dissension within Native American groups and a Union victory the following year at Honey Springs, Arkansas, reduced Confederate oper­ations in Indian Territory to guerrilla raids.

In February 1862 land and river forces in north­ern Tennessee won significant victories for the Union.

A hard-drinking Union commander named Ulysses S. Grant saw the strategic importance of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, the Confederate outposts guarding the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. If federal troops could capture these forts, Grant re­alized, they would open two prime routes into the heartland of the Confederacy. In just ten days he seized the forts, cutting off the Confeder­ates so completely that he demanded unconditional surrender of Fort Donelson. A path into Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi now lay open before the Union Army. Grant's achievement of such a surrender from his former West Point roommate, Confederate commander Simon Bolivar Buckner, inspired north­ern public opinion that spring.

Grant moved on into southern Tennessee and the first of the war's shockingly bloody encounters, the Battle of Shiloh. On April 6 Confederate general Al­bert Sidney Johnston caught federal troops with their backs to the water awaiting reinforcements along the

Grant's Tennessee Campaign and the Battle of Shiloh

Tennessee River. The Confederates attacked early in the morning and inflicted heavy damage all day. Close to victory, General Johnston was shot from his horse and killed. Southern forces almost achieved a break­through, but Union reinforcements arrived that night. The next day the tide of battle turned, and after ten hours of terrible combat, Grant's men forced the Con­federates to withdraw.

Neither side won a victory at Shiloh, yet the losses were staggering. Northern troops lost 13,000 men (killed, wounded, or captured) out of 63,000; south­erners sacrificed 11,000 out of 40,000. Total casualties in this single battle exceeded those in all three of America's previous wars combined. Now both sides were beginning to sense the true nature of the war. "I saw an open field," Grant recalled, "over which Con­federates had made repeated charges ..., so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground." Shiloh utterly changed Grant's thinking about the war. He had hoped that southerners soon would be "heartily tired" of the conflict. After Shiloh, "I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest." Memories of Shiloh battlefield, and many others to come, would haunt the soldiers who survived for the rest of their lives. Herman Melville's "Shiloh, A Re­quiem" captures the pathos of that spring day when armies learned the truth about war.

Skimming lighdy, wheeling still,

The swallows fly low Over the field in clouded days,

The forest-field of Shiloh— Over the field where April rain Solaced the parched ones stretched in pain Through the pause of night That followed the Sunday fight

Around the church of Shiloh— The church so lone, the log-built one, That echoed to many a parting groan And natural prayer

Of dying foemen mingled there— Foemen at morn, but friends at eve—

Fame or country least their care: (What like a bullet can undeceive!)

But now they lie low, While over them the swallows skim,

And all is hushed at Shiloh.

Meanwhile, on the Virginia front, President Lin­coln had a different problem. General McClellan was

America Goes to War, 1861-1862

Both armies experienced religious revivals during the war. This photograph shows members of a largely Irish regiment from New York celebrating Mass at the beginning of the war. Notice the pres­ence of some female visi­tors in the left foreground. (Library of Congress)

McClellan and the Peninsula

slow to move. Only thirty-six, Mc­Clellan had already achieved notable

„ . success as an army officer and rail-

road president. Keenly aware of his historic role, he did not want to fail and insisted on having everything in order before he attacked. Habitually overestimating the size of enemy forces, McClellan called repeatedly for reinforcements and ignored Lincoln's directions to advance. McClel­lan advocated war of limited aims that would lead to a quick reunion. He intended no disruption of slavery, nor any war on noncombatants. McClellan's conserv­ative vision of the war was practically outdated before he ever moved his army into Virginia. Finally he chose to move by a water route, sailing his troops down the Chesapeake, landing them on the peninsula between the York and James Rivers, and advancing on Rich­mond from the east (see Map 15.1).

After a bloody but indecisive battle at Fair Oaks on May 31-June 1, the federal armies moved to within 7 miles of the Confederate capital. They could see the spires on Richmond churches. The Confederate com­manding general, Joseph E. Johnston, was badly wounded at Fair Oaks, and President Jefferson Davis placed his chief military adviser, Robert E. Lee, in com­mand. The fifty-five-year-old Lee was an aristocratic Virginian, a life-long military officer, and a veteran of distinction from the War with Mexico. Although he op­posed secession and found slavery distasteful, Lee loy­ally gave his allegiance to his state. He soon foiled McClellan's legions.

First, he sent Stonewall Jackson's corps of 17,000 northwest into the Shenandoah valley behind Union forces, where they threatened Washington, D.C., and with rapid-strike mobility drew some federal troops away from Richmond to protect their own capital. Further, in mid-June, in an extraordinary four-day ride around the entire Union Army, Confederate cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, a self-styled Virginia cavalier, with red cape and plumed hat, confirmed the exposed position of a major portion of McClellan's army north of the rain-swollen Chickahominy River. Then, in a series of engagements known as the Seven Days Bat­tles, June 26-July 1, Lee struck at McClellan's army. Lee never managed to close his pincers around the re­treating Union forces, but the daring move of taking the majority of his army northeast and attacking the Union right flank, while leaving only a small force to

Chapter 15 Transforming Fire: The Civil War, 1861-1865

—— Union

'■-Confederate

^ Confederate ^victory % No clear victor

Map 15.1 McClellan's Campaign The water route chosen by McClellan to threaten Richmond during the peninsular campaign.

defend Richmond, forced McClellan (always believing he was outnumbered) to retreat toward the James River.

During the sustained fighting of the Seven Days, the Union forces suffered 20,614 casualties, and the Confederates 15,849. After repeated rebel assaults against entrenched positions on high ground at Malvern Hill, an officer concluded: "It was not war, it was murder." By August 3 McClellan withdrew his army back to the Potomac and the environs of Wash­ington. Richmond remained safe for almost two more years.

Buoyed by these results, Jefferson Davis conceived an ambitious plan to turn the tide of the war and gain recognition of the Confederacy by European nations. He ordered a gen­eral offensive, sending Lee north into Maryland and Generals Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg into Kentucky. Calling on residents of Maryland and Kentucky to make a separate peace with his government, Davis also invited northwestern states like Indiana, which sent much of their trade

Confederate Offensive in Maryland and Kentucky

down the Mississippi to New Orleans, to leave the

Union. This was a coordinated effort to take the war to the North, to contest the allegiance of the border states, and to try to force a decisive turning point.

The plan was promising, but every part of the of­fensive failed. In the bloodiest day of the entire war, September 17, 1862, McClellan turned Lee back from Sharpsburg, Maryland. In the Battle of Antietam 5,000 men died (3,500 had died at Shiloh), and another 18,000 were wounded. Lee was lucky to escape de­struction, for McClellan had intercepted a lost battle order, wrapped around cigars for each Confederate corps commander and inadvertently dropped by a courier. But McClellan moved slowly, failed to use his larger forces in simultaneous attacks all along the line, and allowed Lee's stricken army to retreat to safety across the Potomac. In the wake of Antietam, Lincoln removed McClellan from command.

In Kentucky Generals Smith and Bragg secured Lexington and Frankfurt, but their effort to force the Yankees back to the Ohio River was stopped at the Battle of Perryville on October 8. Bragg's army re­treated back into Tennessee where, on December 31, 1862, to January 2, 1863, they fought an indecisive but much bloodier battle at Murfreesboro. Casualties ex­ceeded even those of Shiloh and many lives were sacri­ficed on a bitter winter landscape.

Confederate leaders had marshaled all their strength for a breakthrough but had failed. Outnum­bered and disadvantaged in resources, the South could not continue the offensive. Profoundly disappointed, Davis admitted to a committee of Confederate repre­sentatives that southerners were entering "the darkest and most dangerous period we have yet had." Tena­cious defense and stoic endurance now seemed the South's only long-range hope.

But 1862 also brought painful lessons to the North. Confederate general J. E. B. Stuart executed a daring cavalry raid into Pennsylvania in October. Then on December 13 Union general Ambrose Burn-side, now in command of the Army of the Potomac, unwisely ordered his soldiers to attack Lee's army, which held fortified positions on high ground at Fred­ericksburg, Virginia. Lee's men performed so coolly and controlled the engagement so thoroughly that Lee was moved to say, "It is well that war is so terrible. We should grow too fond of it." Burnside's repeated as­saults up Marye's Heights shocked even the oppo­nents. "The Federals had fallen like the steady dripping of rain from the eaves of a house," remarked Confederate general James Longstreet. And a Union officer observed the carnage of 1,300 dead and 9,600

In October 1862 in New York City, photographer Mathew Brady opened an exhibition of photographs from the Battle of Antietam. Although few knew it, Brady's vision was very poor, and this photograph of Confederate dead was actually made by his assistants, Alexander Gardner and James F. Gibson. (Library of Congress)

wounded Union soldiers: "The whole plain was covered with men, prostrate and dropping. ... I had never before seen fighting like that—nothing ap­proaching it in terrible uproar and destruction .. . the next brigade coming up in succession would do its duty, and melt like snow coming down on warm ground."

The rebellion was far from being suppressed. Both sides were learning that they would have to pay a terrible price. And people on both home fronts had now to decide just what they would endure to win a war of one society against the other.

War Transforms the South

The war caused tremendous disruptions in civilian life and altered southern society beyond all expectations. One of the first traditions to fall was the southern prefer­ence for local and limited government. States' rights had been a formative ideology for the Confederacy, but state governments were weak and sketchy opera­tions. The average citizen, on whom the hand of gov­ernment had rested lightly, probably knew county au­thorities best. To withstand the massive power of the North, however, the South needed to centralize; like the colonial revolutionaries, southerners faced a choice of join together or die separately. No one saw the necessity of centralization more clearly than Jeffer­son Davis. If the states of the Confederacy insisted on fighting separately, said Davis, "we had better make terms as soon as we can."

Promptly Davis moved to bring all arms, supplies, and troops under his control. But by early 1862 the scope and duration of the conflict re­quired something more. Tens of thousands of Confederate soldiers had volunteered for just one year's service, planning to return home in the spring to plant their crops. To keep southern armies in the field, the War Department encouraged reen-listments and called for new volunteers. However, as one official admitted, "the spirit of volunteering had died out." Three states threatened or instituted a draft. Finally, faced with a critical shortage of troops, in April

The

Confederacy and

Centralization of Power

Chapter 15 Transforming Fire: The Civil War, 1861-1865

This Confederate soldier, like thousands of his comrades, took advantage of an opportunity to pose with his wife and brother. As the death toll mounted and suffering in­creased, southern women grew less willing to urge their men into battle. (Collection of Larry Williford)

1862 the Confederate government enacted the first national conscription (draft) law in American history. Thus the war forced unprecedented change on states that had seceded out of fear of change.

Jefferson Davis was a strong chief executive. He adopted a firm leadership role toward the Confederate Congress, which raised taxes and later passed a tax-in-kind—paid in farm products. Almost three thousand agents dispersed to collect the tax, assisted by almost fifteen hundred appraisers. Where opposition arose, the government suspended the writ of habeas corpus (which prevented individuals from being held without trial) and imposed martial law. In the face of political opposition that cherished states' rights, Davis proved unyielding. This tax system, however, proved inade­quate to the South's war effort.

To replace the food that men in uniform would have grown, Davis exhorted farmers to switch from cash crops to food crops; he encouraged the states to require them to do so. But the army remained short of food and labor. In emergencies the War Department resorted to impressing slaves to work on fortifications, and after 1861 the government relied heavily on con­fiscation of food to feed the troops. Officers swooped down on farms in the line of march and carted away grain, meat, wagons, and draft: animals.

Soon the Confederate administration in Rich­mond gained virtually complete control over the southern economy. Because it controlled the supply of labor through conscription, the administration could compel industry to work on government contracts and supply the military's needs. The Confederate Con­gress also gave the central government almost com­plete control of the railroads. New statutes even limited corporate profits and dividends. A large bu­reaucracy sprang up to administer these operations: over seventy thousand civilians staffed the Confeder­ate administration. By the war's end, the southern bu­reaucracy was larger in proportion to population than its northern counterpart. Early in the war, Davis hoped that such centralization would inspire a new na­tional loyalty across the South.

Clerks and subordinate officials crowded the towns and cities where Confederate departments set up their offices. The sudden population Wartimebooms that resulted overwhelmed e *h me housing supply and stimulated
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