Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee




НазваниеJane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee
страница6/24
Дата08.09.2012
Размер1.04 Mb.
ТипДокументы
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   24

I.C.5. Monkeypox Monkeypox is a rare viral disease found mostly in the rain forest countries of Central and West Africa. The disease is caused by an orthopoxvirus that is similar in appearance to smallpox but causes a milder disease. The only recognized outbreak of human monkeypox in the United States was detected in June 2003 after several people became ill following contact with sick pet prairie dogs. Infection in the prairie dogs was subsequently traced to their contact with a shipment of animals from Africa, including giant Gambian rats 263. This outbreak demonstrates the importance of recognition and prompt reporting of unusual disease presentations by clinicians to enable prompt identification of the etiology; and the potential of epizootic diseases to spread from animal reservoirs to humans through personal and occupational exposure

264

.

Limited data on transmission of monkeypox are available. Transmission from infected animals and humans is believed to occur primarily through direct contact with lesions and respiratory secretions; airborne transmission from animals to humans is unlikely but cannot be excluded, and may have occurred in veterinary practices (e.g., during administration of nebulized medications to ill prairie dogs 265). Among humans, four instances of monkeypox transmission within hospitals have been reported in Africa among children, usually related to sharing the same ward or bed 266, 267. Additional recent literature documents transmission of Congo Basin monkeypox in a hospital compound for an extended number of generations

268

.

There has been no evidence of airborne or any other person-to-person transmission of monkeypox in the United States, and no new cases of monkeypox have been identified since the outbreak in June 2003 269. The outbreak strain is a clade of monkeypox distinct from the Congo Basin clade and may have different epidemiologic properties (including human-to-human transmission potential) from monkeypox strains of the Congo Basin 270; this awaits further study. Smallpox vaccine is 85% protective against Congo Basin monkeypox 271. Since there is an associated case fatality rate of <10%, administration of smallpox vaccine within 4 days to individuals who have had direct exposure to patients or animals with monkeypox is a reasonable consideration 272. For the most current information on monkeypox, see www.cdc.gov/ncidod/monkeypox/clinicians.htm .

I.C.6. Noroviruses Noroviruses, formerly referred to as Norwalk-like viruses, are members of the Caliciviridae family. These agents are transmitted via contaminated food or water and from person-to-person, causing explosive outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease 273. Environmental contamination also has been documented as a contributing factor in ongoing transmission during outbreaks 274, 275. Although noroviruses cannot be propagated in cell culture, DNA detection by molecular diagnostic techniques has facilitated a greater appreciation of their role in outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease 276. Reported outbreaks in hospitals 132, 142, 277, nursing homes 275, 278-283, cruise ships 284, 285, hotels 143, 147, schools 148, and large crowded shelters established for hurricane evacuees 286, demonstrate their highly contagious nature, the disruptive impact they have in healthcare facilities and the community, and the difficulty of controlling outbreaks in settings where people share common facilites and space. Of note, there is nearly a 5 fold increase in the risk to patients in outbreaks where a patient is the index case compared with exposure of patients during outbreaks where a staff member is the index case 287.

The average incubation period for gastroenteritis caused by noroviruses is 12-48 hours and the clinical course lasts 12-60 hours 273. Illness is characterized by acute onset of nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, and/or diarrhea. The disease is largely self-limited; rarely, death caused by severe dehydration can occur, particularly among the elderly with debilitating health conditions.

The epidemiology of norovirus outbreaks shows that even though primary cases may result from exposure to a fecally-contaminated food or water, secondary and tertiary cases often result from person-to-person transmission that is facilitated by contamination of fomites 273, 288 and dissemination of infectious particles, especially during the process of vomiting 132, 142, 143, 147, 148, 273, 279, 280. Widespread, persistent and inapparent contamination of the environment and fomites can make outbreaks extremely difficult to control 147, 275, 284.These clinical observations and the detection of norovirus DNA on horizontal surfaces 5 feet above the level that might be touched normally suggest that, under certain circumstances, aerosolized particles may travel distances beyond 3 feet 147. It is hypothesized that infectious particles may be aerosolized from vomitus, inhaled, and swallowed. In addition, individuals who are responsible for cleaning the environment may be at increased risk of infection. Development of disease and transmission may be facilitated by the low infectious dose (i.e., <100 viral particles) 289 and the resistance of these viruses to the usual cleaning and disinfection agents (i.e., may survive < 10 ppm chlorine) 290-292. An alternate phenolic agent that was shown to be effective against feline calicivirus was used for environmental cleaning in one outbreak 275, 293. There are insufficient data to determine the efficacy of alcohol-based hand rubs against noroviruses when the hands are not visibly soiled 294. Absence of disease in certain individuals during an outbreak may be explained by protection from infection conferred by the B histo-blood group antigen 295. Consultation on outbreaks of gastroenteritis is available through CDC’s Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases 296.

I.C.7. Hemorrhagic fever viruses (HFV) The hemorrhagic fever viruses are a mixed group of viruses that cause serious disease with high fever, skin rash, bleeding diathesis, and in some cases, high mortality; the disease caused is referred to as viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF). Among the more commonly known HFVs are Ebola and Marburg viruses (Filoviridae), Lassa virus (Arenaviridae), Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever and Rift Valley Fever virus (Bunyaviridae), and Dengue and Yellow fever viruses (Flaviviridae) 212, 297. These viruses are transmitted to humans via contact with infected animals or via arthropod vectors. While none of these viruses is endemic in the United States, outbreaks in affected countries provide potential opportunities for importation by infected humans and animals. Furthermore, there are concerns that some of these agents could be used as bioweapons 212. Person-to-person transmission is documented for Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses. In resource-limited healthcare settings, transmission of these agents to healthcare personnel, patients and visitors has been described and in some outbreaks has accounted for a large proportion of cases 298-300. Transmissions within households also have occurred among individuals who had direct contact with ill persons or their body fluids, but not to those who did not have such contact 301.

Evidence concerning the transmission of HFVs has been summarized 212, 302. Person-to-person transmission is associated primarily with direct blood and body fluid contact. Percutaneous exposure to contaminated blood carries a particularly high risk for transmission and increased mortality 303, 304. The finding of large numbers of Ebola viral particles in the skin and the lumina of sweat glands has raised concern that transmission could occur from direct contact with intact skin though epidemiologic evidence to support this is lacking 305. Postmortem handling of infected bodies is an important risk for transmission 301, 306, 307. In rare situations, cases in which the mode of transmission was unexplained among individuals with no known direct contact , have led to speculation that airborne transmission could have occurred 298. However, airborne transmission of naturally occurring HFVs in humans has not been seen. In one study of airplane passengers exposed to an in-flight index case of Lassa fever, there was no transmission to any passengers308 .

In the laboratory setting, animals have been infected experimentally with Marburg or Ebola viruses via direct inoculation of the nose, mouth and/or conjunctiva 309, 310 and by using mechanically generated virus-containing aerosols 311, 312. Transmission of Ebola virus among laboratory primates in an animal facility has been described 313. Secondarily infected animals were in individual cages and separated by approximately 3 meters. Although the possibility of airborne transmission was suggested, the authors were not able to exclude droplet or indirect contact transmission in this incidental observation.

Guidance on infection control precautions for HVFs that are transmitted person-to-person have been published by CDC 1, 211 and by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies 212. The most recent recommendations at the time of publication of this document were posted on the CDC website on 5/19/05

314. Inconsistencies among the various recommendations have raised questions about the appropriate precautions to use in U.S. hospitals. In less developed countries, outbreaks of HFVs have been controlled with basic hygiene, barrier precautions, safe injection practices, and safe burial practices 299, 306. The preponderance of evidence on HFV transmission indicates that Standard, Contact and Droplet Precautions with eye protection are effective in protecting healthcare personnel and visitors who may attend an infected patient. Single gloves are adequate for routine patient care; double-gloving is advised during invasive procedures (e.g., surgery) that pose an increased risk for blood exposure. Routine eye protection (i.e. goggles or face shield) is particularly important. Fluid-resistant gowns should be worn for all patient contact. Airborne Precautions are not required for routine patient care; however, use of AIIRs is prudent when procedures that could generate infectious aerosols are performed (e.g., endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, suctioning, autopsy procedures involving oscillating saws). N95 or higher level respirators may provide added protection for individuals in a room during aerosol-generating procedures (Table 3, Appendix A). When a patient with a syndrome consistent with hemorrhagic fever also has a history of travel to an endemic area, precautions are initiated upon presentation and then modified as more information is obtained (Table 2). Patients with hemorrhagic fever syndrome in the setting of a suspected bioweapon attack should be managed using Airborne Precautions, including AIIRs, since the epidemiology of a potentially weaponized hemorrhagic fever virus is unpredictable.

I.D. Transmission risks associated with specific types of healthcare settings

Numerous factors influence differences in transmission risks among the various healthcare settings. These include the population characteristics (e.g., increased susceptibility to infections, type and prevalence of indwelling devices), intensity of care, exposure to environmental sources, length of stay, and frequency of interaction between patients/residents with each other and with HCWs. These factors, as well as organizational priorities, goals, and resources, influence how different healthcare settings adapt transmission prevention guidelines to meet their specific needs 315, 316. Infection control management decisions are informed by data regarding institutional experience/epidemiology, trends in community and institutional HAIs, local, regional, and national epidemiology, and emerging infectious disease threats.

I.D.1. Hospitals Infection transmission risks are present in all hospital settings. However, certain hospital settings and patient populations have unique conditions that predispose patients to infection and merit special mention. These are often sentinel sites for the emergence of new transmission risks that may be unique to that setting or present opportunities for transmission to other settings in the hospital.

I.D.1.a. Intensive Care Units Intensive care units (ICUs) serve patients who are immunocompromised by disease state and/or by treatment modalities, as well as patients with major trauma, respiratory failure and other life-threatening conditions (e.g., myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, overdoses, strokes, gastrointestinal bleeding, renal failure, hepatic failure, multi-organ system failure, and the extremes of age). Although ICUs account for a relatively small proportion of hospitalized patients, infections acquired in these units accounted for >20% of all HAIs 317. In the National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance (NNIS) system, 26.6% of HAIs were reported from ICU and high risk nursery (NICU) patients in 2002 (NNIS, unpublished data). This patient population has increased susceptibility to colonization and infection, especially with MDROs and Candida sp. 318, 319, because of underlying diseases and conditions, the invasive medical devices and technology used in their care (e.g. central venous catheters and other intravascular devices, mechanical ventilators, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), hemodialysis/-filtration, pacemakers, implantable left ventricular assist devices), the frequency of contact with healthcare personnel, prolonged length of stay, and prolonged exposure to antimicrobial agents 320-331. Furthermore, adverse patient outcomes in this setting are more severe and are associated with a higher mortality 332. Outbreaks associated with a variety of bacterial, fungal and viral pathogens due to common-source and person-to-person transmissions are frequent in adult and pediatric

ICUs 31, 333-336, 337 , 338 .

I.D.1.b. Burn Units Burn wounds can provide optimal conditions for colonization, infection, and transmission of pathogens; infection acquired by burn patients is a frequent cause of morbidity and mortality 320, 339, 340. In patients with a burn injury involving >30% of the total body surface area (TBSA), the risk of invasive burn wound infection is particularly high 341, 342. Infections that occur in patients with burn injury involving <30% TBSA are usually associated with the use of invasive devices. Methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus, MRSA, enterococci, including VRE, gram-negative bacteria, and candida are prevalent pathogens in burn infections 53, 340, 343-350 and outbreaks of these organisms have been reported 351-354. Shifts over time in the predominance of pathogens causing infections among burn patients often lead to changes in burn care practices 343, 355-358. Burn wound infections caused by Aspergillus sp. or other environmental molds may result from exposure to supplies contaminated during construction 359 or to dust generated during construction or other environmental disruption 360.

Hydrotherapy equipment is an important environmental reservoir of gram-negative organisms. Its use for burn care is discouraged based on demonstrated associations between use of contaminated hydrotherapy equipment and infections. Burn wound infections and colonization, as well as bloodstream infections, caused by multidrug-resistant P. aeruginosa 361, A. baumannii 362, and MRSA 352 have been associated with hydrotherapy; excision of burn wounds in operating rooms is preferred.

Advances in burn care, specifically early excision and grafting of the burn wound, use of topical antimicrobial agents, and institution of early enteral feeding, have led to decreased infectious complications. Other advances have included prophylactic antimicrobial usage, selective digestive decontamination (SDD), and use of antimicrobial-coated catheters (ACC), but few epidemiologic studies and no efficacy studies have been performed to show the relative benefit of these

357

measures .

There is no consensus on the most effective infection control practices to prevent transmission of infections to and from patients with serious burns (e.g., single-bed rooms 358, laminar flow 363 and high efficiency particulate air filtration [HEPA] 360 or maintaining burn patients in a separate unit without exposure to patients or equipment from other units 364). There also is controversy regarding the need for and type of barrier precautions for routine care of burn patients. One retrospective study demonstrated efficacy and cost effectiveness of a simplified barrier isolation protocol for wound colonization, emphasizing handwashing and use of gloves, caps, masks and plastic impermeable aprons (rather than isolation gowns) for direct patient contact 365 . However, there have been no studies that define the most effective combination of infection control precautions for use in burn settings. Prospective studies in this area are needed.

I.D.1.c. Pediatrics Studies of the epidemiology of HAIs in children have identified unique infection control issues in this population 63, 64, 366-370. Pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) patients and the lowest birthweight babies in the high-risk nursery (HRN) monitored in the NNIS system have had high rates of central venous catheter-associated bloodstream infections 64, 320, 369-372. Additionally, there is a high prevalence of community-acquired infections among hospitalized infants and young children who have not yet become immune either by vaccination or by natural infection. The result is more patients and their sibling visitors with transmissible infections present in pediatric healthcare settings, especially during seasonal epidemics (e.g., pertussis 36, 40, 41, respiratory viral infections including those caused by RSV 24, influenza viruses 373, parainfluenza virus 374, human metapneumovirus 375, and adenoviruses 376; rubeola [measles]34, varicella [chickenpox] 377, and rotavirus 38, 378).

Close physical contact between healthcare personnel and infants and young children (eg. cuddling, feeding, playing, changing soiled diapers, and cleaning copious uncontrolled respiratory secretions) provides abundant opportunities for transmission of infectious material. Practices and behaviors such as congregation of children in play areas where toys and bodily secretions are easily shared and family members rooming-in with pediatric patients can further increase the risk of transmission. Pathogenic bacteria have been recovered from toys used by hospitalized patients 379; contaminated bath toys were implicated in an outbreak of multidrug-resistant P. aeruginosa on a pediatric oncology unit 80. In addition, several patient factors increase the likelihood that infection will result from exposure to pathogens in healthcare settings (e.g., immaturity of the neonatal immune system, lack of previous natural infection and resulting immunity, prevalence of patients with congenital or acquired immune deficiencies, congenital anatomic anomalies, and use of life-saving invasive devices in neontal and pediatric intensive care units) 63. There are theoretical concerns that infection risk will increase in association with innovative practices used in the NICU for the purpose of improving developmental outcomes, Such factors include co-bedding 380 and kangaroo care 381 that may increase opportunity for skin-to-skin exposure of multiple gestation infants to each other and to their mothers, respectively; although infection risk smay actually be reduced among infants receiving kangaroo care 382. Children who attend child care centers 383, 384 and pediatric rehabilitation units 385 may increase the overall burden of antimicrobial resistance (eg. by contributing to the reservoir of community-associated MRSA [CA-MRSA]) 386-391 . Patients in chronic care facilities may have increased rates of colonization with resistant GNBs and may be sources of introduction of resistant organisms to acute care settings 50.

I.D.2. Non-acute healthcare settings Healthcare is provided in various settings outside of hospitals including facilities, such as long-term care facilities (LTCF)

(e.g. nursing homes), homes for the developmentally disabled, settings where behavioral health services are provided, rehabilitation centers and hospices392 . In addition, healthcare may be provided in nonhealthcare settings such as workplaces with occupational health clinics, adult day care centers, assisted living facilities, homeless shelters, jails and prisons, school clinics and infirmaries. Each of these settings has unique circumstances and population risks to consider when designing and implementing an infection control program. Several of the most common settings and their particular challenges are discussed below. While this Guideline does not address each setting, the principles and strategies provided may be adapted and applied as appropriate.

I.D.2.a. Long-term care The designation LTCF applies to a diverse group of residential settings, ranging from institutions for the developmentally disabled to nursing homes for the elderly and pediatric chronic-care facilities 393-395. Nursing homes for the elderly predominate numerically and frequently represent long-term care as a group of facilities. Approximately 1.8 million Americans reside in the nation’s 16,500 nursing homes 396. Estimates of HAI rates of 1.8 to 13.5 per 1000 resident-care days have been reported with a range of 3 to 7 per 1000 resident-care days in the more rigorous studies 397-401. The infrastructure described in the Department of Veterans Affairs nursing home care units is a promising example for the development of a nationwide HAI surveillance system for LTCFs 402.

LCTFs are different from other healthcare settings in that elderly patients at increased risk for infection are brought together in one setting and remain in the facility for extended periods of time; for most residents, it is their home. An atmosphere of community is fostered and residents share common eating and living areas, and participate in various facility-sponsored activities 403, 404. Since able residents interact freely with each other, controlling transmission of infection in this setting is challenging 405. Residents who are colonized or infected with certain microorganisms are, in some cases, restricted to their room. However, because of the psychosocial risks associated with such restriction, it has been recommended that psychosocial needs be balanced with infection control needs in the LTCF setting 406-409. Documented LTCF outbreaks have been caused by various viruses (e.g., influenza virus 35, 410-412, rhinovirus 413, adenovirus (conjunctivitis) 414, norovirus 278, 279 275, 281) and bacteria, including group A streptococcus 162, B. pertussis 415, non-susceptible S. pneumoniae 197, 198, other MDROs, and Clostridium difficile 416) These pathogens can lead to substantial morbidity and mortality, and increased medical costs; prompt detection and implementation of effective control measures are required.

Risk factors for infection are prevalent among LTCF residents 395, 417, 418. Age-related declines in immunity may affect responses to immunizations for influenza and other infectious agents, and increase susceptibility to tuberculosis. Immobility, incontinence, dysphagia, underlying chronic diseases, poor functional status, and age-related skin changes increase susceptibility to urinary, respiratory and cutaneous and soft tissue infections, while malnutrition can impair wound healing 419-423. Medications (e.g., drugs that affect level of consciousness, immune function, gastric acid secretions, and normal flora, including antimicrobial therapy) and invasive devices (e.g., urinary catheters and feeding tubes) heighten susceptibility to infection and colonization in LTCF residents 424-426. Finally, limited functional status and total dependence on healthcare personnel for activities of daily living have been identified as independent risk factors for infection 401, 417, 427 and for colonization with MRSA 428, 429 and ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae 430. Several position papers and review articles have been published that provide guidance on various aspects of infection control and antimicrobial resistance in LTCFs 406-408, 431-436. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have established regulations for the prevention of infection in LTCFs 437.

Because residents of LTCFs are hospitalized frequently, they can transfer pathogens between LTCFs and healthcare facilities in which they receive care 8, 438-441. This is also true for pediatric long-term care populations. Pediatric chronic care facilities have been associated with importing extended-spectrum cephalosporin-resistant, gram-negative bacilli into one PICU 50. Children from pediatric rehabilitation units may contribute to the reservoir of community-associated MRSA 385, 389-391.

I.D.2.b. Ambulatory Care In the past decade, healthcare delivery in the United States has shifted from the acute, inpatient hospital to a variety of ambulatory and community-based settings, including the home. Ambulatory care is provided in hospital-based outpatient clinics, nonhospital-based clinics and physician offices, public health clinics, free-standing dialysis centers, ambulatory surgical centers, urgent care centers, and many others. In 2000, there were 83 million visits to hospital outpatient clinics and more than 823 million visits to physician offices 442; ambulatory care now accounts for most patient encounters with the health care system 443. In these settings, adapting transmission prevention guidelines is challenging because patients remain in common areas for prolonged periods waiting to be seen by a healthcare provider or awaiting admission to the hospital, examination or treatment rooms are turned around quickly with limited cleaning, and infectious patients may not be recognized immediately. Furthermore, immunocompromised patients often receive chemotherapy in infusion rooms where they stay for extended periods of time along with other types of patients.

There are few data on the risk of HAIs in ambulatory care settings, with the exception of hemodialysis centers 18 , 444, 445. Transmission of infections in outpatient settings has been reviewed in three publications 446-448. Goodman and Solomon summarized 53 clusters of infections associated with the outpatient setting from 1961-1990 446. Overall, 29 clusters were associated with common source transmission from contaminated solutions or equipment, 14 with person-to-person transmission from or involving healthcare personnel and ten associated with airborne or droplet transmission among patients and healthcare workers. Transmission of bloodborne pathogens (i.e., hepatitis B and C viruses and, rarely, HIV) in outbreaks, sometimes involving hundreds of patients, continues to occur in ambulatory settings. These outbreaks often are related to common source exposures, usually a contaminated medical device, multi-dose vial, or intravenous solution 82, 449-453. In all cases, transmission has been attributed to failure to adhere to fundamental infection control principles, including safe injection practices and aseptic technique.This subject has been reviewed and recommended infection control and safe injection practices summarized 454.

Airborne transmission of M.tuberculosis and measles in ambulatory settings, most frequently emergency departments, has been reported 34, 127, 446, 448, 455-457. Measles virus was transmitted in physician offices and other outpatient settings during an era when immunization rates were low and measles outbreaks in the community were occurring regularly 34, 122, 458. Rubella has been transmitted in the outpatient obstetric setting 33; there are no published reports of varicella transmission in the outpatient setting. In the ophthalmology setting, adenovirus type 8 epidemic keratoconjunctivitis has been transmitted via incompletely disinfected ophthalmology equipment and/or from healthcare workers to patients, presumably by contaminated hands 17, 446, 448, 459-462.

If transmission in outpatient settings is to be prevented, screening for potentially infectious symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, especially those who may be at risk for transmitting airborne infectious agents (e.g., M. tuberculosis, varicella-zoster virus, rubeola [measles]), is necessary at the start of the initial patient encounter. Upon identification of a potentially infectious patient, implementation of prevention measures, including prompt separation of potentially infectious patients and implementation of appropriate control measures (e.g., Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette and Transmission-Based Precautions) can decrease transmission risks 9, 12. Transmission of MRSA and VRE in outpatient settings has not been reported, but the association of CA­MRSA in healthcare personnel working in an outpatient HIV clinic with environmental CA-MRSA contamination in that clinic, suggests the possibility of transmission in that setting 463. Patient-to-patient transmission of Burkholderia species and Pseudomonas aeruginosa in outpatient clinics for adults and children with cystic fibrosis has been confirmed 464, 465.

I.D.2.c. Home Care Home care in the United States is delivered by over 20,000 provider agencies that include home health agencies, hospices, durable medical equipment providers, home infusion therapy services, and personal care and support services providers. Home care is provided to patients of all ages with both acute and chronic conditions. The scope of services ranges from assistance with activities of daily living and physical and occupational therapy to the care of wounds, infusion therapy, and chronic ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD).

The incidence of infection in home care patients, other than those associated with infusion therapy is not well studied 466-471 . However, data collection and calculation of infection rates have been accomplished for central venous catheter-associated bloodstream infections in patients receiving home infusion therapy 470-474 and for the risk of blood contact through percutaneous or mucosal exposures, demonstrating that surveillance can be performed in this setting 475. Draft definitions for home care associated infections have been developed 476.

Transmission risks during home care are presumed to be minimal. The main transmission risks to home care patients are from an infectious healthcare provider or contaminated equipment; providers also can be exposed to an infectious patient during home visits. Since home care involves patient care by a limited number of personnel in settings without multiple patients or shared equipment, the potential reservoir of pathogens is reduced. Infections of home care providers, that could pose a risk to home care patients include infections transmitted by the airborne or droplet routes (e.g., chickenpox, tuberculosis, influenza), and skin infestations (e.g., scabies 69 and lice) and infections (e.g.,impetigo) transmitted by direct or indirect contact. There are no published data on indirect transmission of MDROs from one home care patient to another, although this is theoretically possible if contaminated equipment is transported from an infected or colonized patient and used on another patient. Of note, investigation of the first case of VISA in homecare 186 and the first 2 reported cases of VRSA 178, 180, 181, 183 found no evidence of transmission of VISA or VRSA to other home care recipients. Home health care also may contribute to antimicrobial resistance; a review of outpatient vancomycin use found 39% of recipients did not receive the antibiotic according to recommended guidelines 477.

Although most home care agencies implement policies and procedures to prevent transmission of organisms, the current approach is based on the adaptation of the 1996 Guideline for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals 1 as well as other professional guidance 478, 479. This issue has been very challenging in the home care industry and practice has been inconsistent and frequently not evidence-based. For example, many home health agencies continue to observe “nursing bag technique,” a practice that prescribes the use of barriers between the nursing bag and environmental surfaces in the home 480. While the home environment may not always appear clean, the use of barriers between two non­critical surfaces has been questioned 481, 482. Opportunites exist to conduct research in home care related to infection transmission risks 483.

I.D.2.d. Other sites of healthcare delivery Facilities that are not primarily healthcare settings but in which healthcare is delivered include clinics in correctional facilities and shelters. Both settings can have suboptimal features, such as crowded conditions and poor ventilation. Economically disadvantaged individuals who may have chronic illnesses and healthcare problems related to alcoholism, injection drug use, poor nutrition, and/or inadequate shelter often receive their primary healthcare at sites such as these 484. Infectious diseases of special concern for transmission include tuberculosis, scabies, respiratory infections (e.g., N. meningitides, S. pneumoniae), sexually transmitted and bloodborne diseases (e.g.,HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, gonorrhea), hepatitis A virus (HAV), diarrheal agents such as norovirus, and foodborne diseases 286, 485-488. A high index of suspicion for tuberculosis and CA-MRSA in these populations is needed as outbreaks in these settings or among the populations they serve have been reported 489-497.

Patient encounters in these types of facilities provide an opportunity to deliver recommended immunizations and screen for M. tuberculosis infection in addition to diagnosing and treating acute illnesses 498. Recommended infection control measures in these non-traditional areas designated for healthcare delivery are the same as for other ambulatory care settings. Therefore, these settings must be equipped to observe Standard Precautions and, when indicated, Transmission-Based Precautions.

I.E. Transmission risks associated with special patient populations

As new treatments emerge for complex diseases, unique infection control challenges associated with special patient populations need to be addressed.

I.E.1. Immunocompromised patients Patients who have congenital primary immune deficiencies or acquired disease (eg. treatment-induced immune deficiencies) are at increased risk for numerous types of infections while receiving healthcare and may be located throughout the healthcare facility. The specific defects of the immune system determine the types of infections that are most likely to be acquired (e.g., viral infections are associated with T-cell defects and fungal and bacterial infections occur in patients who are neutropenic). As a general group, immunocompromised patients can be cared for in the same environment as other patients; however, it is always advisable to minimize exposure to other patients with transmissible infections such as influenza and other respiratory viruses 499, 500. The use of more intense chemotherapy regimens for treatment of childhood leukemia may be associated with prolonged periods of neutropenia and suppression of other components of the immune system, extending the period of infection risk and raising the concern that additional precautions may be indicated for select groups 501, 502. With the application of newer and more intense immunosuppressive therapies for a variety of medical conditions (e.g., rheumatologic disease 503, 504, inflammatory bowel disease 505), immunosuppressed patients are likely to be more widely distributed throughout a healthcare facility rather than localized to single patient units (e.g.

hematology-oncology). Guidelines for preventing infections in certain groups of immunocompromised patients have been published 15, 506, 507.

Published data provide evidence to support placing allogeneic HSCT patients in a Protective Environment 15, 157, 158. Also, three guidelines have been developed that address the special requirements of these immunocompromised patients, including use of antimicrobial prophylaxis and engineering controls to create a Protective Environment for the prevention of infections caused by Aspergillus spp. and other environmental fungi 11, 14, 15. As more intense chemotherapy regimens associated with prolonged periods of neutropenia or graft-versus-host disease are implemented, the period of risk and duration of environmental protection may need to be prolonged beyond the traditional 100 days 508.

I.E.2. Cystic fibrosis patients Patients with cystic fibrosis (CF) require special consideration when developing infection control guidelines. Compared to other patients, CF patients require additional protection to prevent transmission from contaminated respiratory therapy equipment 509-513. Infectious agents such as Burkholderia cepacia complex and P. aeruginosa 464, 465, 514, 515 have unique clinical and prognostic significance. In CF patients, B. cepacia infection has been associated with increased morbidity and mortality 516-518, while delayed acquisition of chronic P.aeruginosa infection may be associated with an improved long-term clinical outcome 519, 520.

Person-to-person transmission of B. cepacia complex has been demonstrated among children 517 and adults 521 with CF in healthcare settings 464, 522, during various social contacts 523, most notably attendance at camps for patients with CF 524, and among siblings with CF 525. Successful infection control measures used to prevent transmission of respiratory secretions include segregation of CF patients from each other in ambulatory and hospital settings (including use of private rooms with separate showers), environmental decontamination of surfaces and equipment contaminated with respiratory secretions, elimination of group chest physiotherapy sessions, and disbanding of CF camps 97, 526. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation published a consensus document with evidence-based recommendations for infection control practices for CF patients 20.

I.F. New therapies associated with potentially transmissible infectious agents

I.F.1. Gene therapy Gene therapy has has been attempted using a number of different viral vectors, including nonreplicating retroviruses, adenoviruses, adeno­associated viruses, and replication-competent strains of poxviruses. Unexpected adverse events have restricted the prevalence of gene therapy protocols.

The infectious hazards of gene therapy are theoretical at this time, but require meticulous surveillance due to the possible occurrence of in vivo recombination and the subsequent emergence of a transmissible genetically altered pathogen. Greatest concern attends the use of replication-competent viruses, especially vaccinia. As of the time of publication, no reports have described transmission of a vector virus from a gene therapy recipient to another individual, but surveillance is ongoing. Recommendations for monitoring infection control issues throughout the course of gene therapy trials have been published 527-529 .

I.F.2. Infections transmitted through blood, organs and other tissues The potential hazard of transmitting infectious pathogens through biologic products is a small but ever present risk, despite donor screening. Reported infections transmitted by transfusion or transplantation include West Nile Virus infection 530 cytomegalovirus infection 531, Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease 230, hepatitis C 532, infections with Clostridium spp. 533 and group A streptococcus 534, malaria 535, babesiosis 536, Chagas disease 537, lymphocytic choriomeningitis 538, and rabies539, 540. Therefore, it is important to consider receipt of biologic products when evaluating patients for potential sources of infection.

I.F.3. Xenotransplantation The transplantation of nonhuman cells, tissues, and organs into humans potentially exposes patients to zoonotic pathogens. Transmission of known zoonotic infections (e.g., trichinosis from porcine tissue), constitutes one concern, but also of concern is the possibility that transplantation of nonhuman cells, tissues, or organs may transmit previously unknown zoonotic infections (xenozoonoses) to immunosuppressed human recipients. Potential infections that might accompany transplantation of porcine organs have been described 541 . Guidelines from the U.S. Public Health Service address many infectious diseases and infection control issues that surround the developing field of xenotransplantation 542); work in this area is ongoing.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   24

Похожие:

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconAdvisory committee on immunization practices

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconRanch hand advisory committee

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconVeterinary medicine advisory committee

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconMedical Devices Advisory Committee

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconExternal Advisory Committee on Cities and Communities

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconNational Vaccine Advisory Committee (nvac)

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconWildlife Diversity Policy Advisory Committee

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconStudies on dietary supplements for the control of Aeromonas hydrophila infection in rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss, Walbaum)

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconPeer reviewed by the Arizona Department of Commerce Economic Research Advisory Committee

Jane D. Siegel, md; Emily Rhinehart, rn mph cic; Marguerite Jackson, PhD; Linda Chiarello, rn ms; the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee iconFood and drug administration national institutes of health advisory Committee on: transmissible spongiform

Разместите кнопку на своём сайте:
Библиотека


База данных защищена авторским правом ©lib.znate.ru 2014
обратиться к администрации
Библиотека
Главная страница