Three Scenes of Sovereignty and Power

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International crisis Group (ICG). “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea.”Asia Report N°179, 2 November 2009.

Johnston Alastair Iain. 2007. Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Coordination in the Gulf. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations, Department of Politics and International Relations, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford .

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1Note: Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at a conference organized by Judith Goldstein and Martha Finnemore (Stanford University) and at the 2010 APSA meeting. I would like to acknowledge the editors, discussants John Meyer and Ron Hassner, and conference and panel participants for helpful comments. The discussion of China’s sovereignty dilemmas benefited from personal interviews in Shanghai (September 2009, December 2009) and Beijing (September 2009 and July 2010).

 Krasner (2009:180) defines interdependence sovereignty as “the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.” This sovereignty category is exclusively concerned with control and not authority, with capacity to regulate trans-border flows and their domestic impact, a capacity arguably diminished under globalization. Elsewhere Krasner (2009:15) subsumes “interdependence sovereignty” under “domestic sovereignty,” or the ability of political authorities to control a state’s authority structure and legitimacy within and across its borders effectively. Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty accepts states as juridically independent, autonomous, not subject to external authority (2009:15), a concept that negates the right of states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Westphalian sovereignty is “the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” (2009:179).

2 Krasner (1976) defines power as a resource or attribute, more specifically as economic capabilities (size, per capita income, shares of world trade and investment flows). Krasner’s (1999) book on sovereignty commonly refers to “power asymmetries” as a relational concept--getting others to do something they would otherwise not do--or the ability to determine outcomes, to coerce and control.

3 Regions per se may not have been central to Krasner’s work but the political economy of industrializing regions and their relationship to the industrialized core has been and remains one of his core themes (Krasner 1985). Middle Eastern oil economies were also a special focus in Krasner (1978).

4 Internationalizing models rely on growth and economic performance via integration into the global economy whereas inward-looking models rely on autonomous “self-sufficiency” (Solingen 1998). The two ideal-types also differ in the extent to which states replace or enhance markets. The relationship between states and markets, and economic openness versus closure, have been central to Krasner’s work.

5 Mao’s autarchic model--reacting to “100 years of shame and humiliation” by the West and Japan--denounced external coercion and infringements on sovereignty (Medeiros 2009). The model was less congruent when it came to other countries’ sovereignty, endorsing revolutions throughout the developing world. Another inconvenient incongruence were secret protocols (1950) giving the Soviet Union extraterritorial economic privileges in China (Johnston 2008:206).

6 Sovereignty compromises, in China as elsewhere, evolved over time, sometimes cyclically. Organized hypocrisy was typical of imperial China, where behavior inconsistent with Confucian norms was reinterpreted for domestic audiences (Krasner 2009:222). Late 20th century compromises, though of a different kind, were nothing new for China.

7 A more recent agreement with Pakistan followed other states’ bending of nuclear export rules on behalf of India.

8 As expressed by Ambassador Wang Guangya after endorsing UNSC sanctions against Iran in 2006 <>.

9 Solingen (EAI, 2010). China perceives the influx of North Korean refugees into Yanbian as fueling Korean irredentism.

11 <>; NTI, Global security Newswire, “U.S. Says North Korean Blast "Probably" Nuclear,” June 16, 2009

12 Chinese Foreign Minister Hopes Iran, IAEA 'Step Up' Consultation, AFP December 5, 2007, World News Connection).

13 On Chinese leaders’ concern with China’s reputation as underlying its shift toward CTBT endorsement, see Johnston (2008:113). Both expected material benefits (access to trade, aid, technology, and investment) and symbolic reasons drive China’s concern with reputation according to Medeiros (2009:17).

14 Krasner (2001:28) suggests that Chinese and Tibetans might be better off if Tibet regains some of the autonomy it had as a tributary state under China’s empire, yet domestic resistance pivoted on sovereignty norms has prevented that outcome. On the connection between “losing Taiwan” and “losing power,” see Johnston (2008:210).

15 On permissive and catalytic conditions explaining the origins of these models, see Solingen (2007b and 2009a).

16 Anti-colonialism cannot easily explain differential approaches to the global economy because both regions were subjected to colonial domination, occupation, and exploitation. China’s yoke under colonial powers, Japan’s colonial violence in its region and its own occupation by the US, and Vietnam’s repeated victimization are only some instances of colonial oppression in East Asia.

17 Developmental states usher in industrial transformation; predatory states undercut it even in the narrow sense of capital accumulation (Evans 1995). On MENA’s common features and the strong case for treating the region as a unit, see Abed and Davoodi (2003).

18 Hakimian (2001); AHD Reports (2002-2009); Galal and Hoekman (2003); Elbadawi (2005); Noland and Pack (2005).

19 The same mechanisms--delegitimized mukhabarat (secret police) authoritarian states with mammoth military-industrial complexes--afflicted both inter-Arab and Arab–Israeli relations even prior to the Six Day War (Kerr 1971).

20 Solingen (2009b). Pan-Arab rhetoric camouflaged ethnic minority control by Alawi (Syria), Sudairi (Saudi Arabia), Hashemite (Jordan), and Tikriti (Iraq) tribes, to deflect internal opposition.

21 Halliday (2005: 35) considered those norms epiphenomenal, invoked primarily for “political calculation.”

22 Hitler’s Germany was the textbook imperial strategy. Arab nationalists considered European fascism “a virile politico-economic system superior to other Western models” (Macdonald 1965).

23 The League denied Iraq’s Governing Council the right to represent Iraq (2003) for lacking “sovereign” legitimacy, a particularly poignant justification given the League’s autocratic membership.

24 Taiwan is the exception whereas inexistent or interrupted diplomatic ties have been far more frequent in the Middle East (Syria/Lebanon, Iraq/Syria, Egypt/Iran, Morocco/Iran, Mauritania/Morocco, Libya/Egypt, Egypt/Sudan, Arab states/Israel, etc.). Egypt recalled its ambassador to Algeria following mutual attacks on soccer fans during a playoff game for the 2010 World Cup.

25 Averages for 2000-2008 (See Solingen 2009b for further sources, including for GCC countries discussed below). Intra-Arab trade accounted for 7-10 percent of their total since the 1950s (AHDR 2002:126).

26 The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, accounting for only 1.4 of world GDP (2005).

27 Sovereignty was traditionally exercised over peoples and not over territory in the Arabian peninsula (Legrenzi 2008:195). As oil concessions became important, so did territorially-based disputes.

29 Revisiting his 1982 definition of international regimes, Krasner (2009:12) argues that theoretically neutral definitions of regimes are impossible. In a constructivist world regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” For realism regimes entail rules and norms reflecting the interests of most powerful states. For neoliberal institutionalism regimes are principles, rules, norms that mitigate market failures. The NPR can be understood through these different lenses focusing on norms, power, and institutions respectively but all three have distinct limitations (Solingen 2007a).

30 For instance, prohibiting links between civilian and military programs in non-nuclear-weapons (NNWS) states, institutionally “sanitizing” the nuclear fuel cycle.

31 States must develop and maintain: appropriate physical protection measures; border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking; establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over export, transit, trans-shipment, re-export, financing, and transporting that might contribute to proliferation; establish end-user controls and enforce appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations .
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