2. Radical Revisionism, Militant Challenges and Utopian Projects




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3. Normative Transnational and International Islamic Institutions


It is possible to conceptualise key elements of Islam's religious system as supporting current normative roles for Muslims within global society. The five pillars of Islam, of course, are the Shahada (profession of faith), the Salat (five daily prayers), the Hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina where possible (the 'greater' Hajj occurs during the last lunar month of the year), Zakat (giving of money to hose in need) and Sawm (fasting in daylight hours of the month of Ramadan, see further Nasr 2003). We can link some of these fundamentals to wider flows in the transnational system today, e.g. the Hajj which brings together hundreds of millions of Muslims each year, with the number reaching 1,557,447 pilgrims in 2006 (BNA 2006). The geographical centrality of the holy places in Arabia is also reinforced by the tradition whereby prayer is conducted facing towards Mecca, with the mihrab, a niche, or even small plaque, showing the direction of the holy site (Kennedy 2004, p141)


3a. The Ummah as the Community of Believers


Likewise, the ummah, the community of believers, provides another focus for a transnational network that is nearly global in reach and comprises almost 1.5 billion members. It is crucial to note that for many Muslims this is a key level of their identity, especially when state or governmental structures have been weak or oppresive. As noted by Seyyed Nasr: -


One of the key concepts in Islam is that of the ummah, or the totality of people who are Muslims and constitute the Islamic world. Islam sees history itself in religious terms and refers to other people not primarily by their linguistic or ethnic affiliations but their religious identity, hence the reference to the ummah of Moses or Jesus so often found in Islamic text when discussing Judaism or Christianity. The Islamic ummah is one, bound by solidarity to the Quranic message of Divine Oneness and Sovereignty, the messengership of the Prophet, and acceptance of the Divine Law (al-Shari'ah). Muslims are united by the powerful bond of brotherhood and sisterhood, a bond that is felt strongly to this day despite all the turmoil that has pitted and continues to put Muslims against one another. (Nasr 2003, p15)


This sense of solidarity and brotherhood, ukhuwwah, helped make Islam an appealing religion not just to Arabs, but soon spread to Persian, Turks, Egyptians and a wider community that stretched from Western Africa through Central Asia to enclaves in southern China (Nasr 2003, pp15-16; Quran 3:103). In theory, membership within Islam overcame barriers of ethnicity, race, and status, and 'rejected all forms of racism and tribalism' (Nar 2003, p16, following Quran 49:13), making it an ideal universalising religion. In theory, alongside its core religious believes, Islam could benefit from the great diversity of its followers. Persians, Turks, and Indians would soon contribute to the rich culture and intellectual tradition of Islam. Thus, 'Islam is like a vast tapestry into which all these local cultural modes and varieties are woven like arabesques; the larger pattern they make reflects the Oneness of the Divine Principle' (Nasr 2003, p24).


Having said this, political unity became problematic as soon as the Prophet died, and could not even be easily sustained even through the Abbasid period (Kennedy 2004). The division between Shia and Sunni groups, different claims by different leaders to the prestige of the Caliphate, and a range of orthodox and non-orthodox practices soon created a range of division within the Islamic world. This can be seen, for example, in secondary pilgrimages made to the shrines and tombs of saints by many Muslims, a practice common in Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan), Iran, parts of Iraq Pakistan, and parts of Indonesia, especially Java (Kennedy 2004, p239). This belief in the intercessory power of saints, teachers, and Sufi sheikhs has been viewed as at best unorthodox and verging on idolatry by stricter interpreters, e.g. it is strongly opposed in modern Arabia and Malaysia. Likewise, the impact of de-colonisation, nationalism and modernisation has left a checkerboard of Muslim societies whose states are often at odds with each other, e.g. historical tensions between Syria and Turkey, Iran and Turkey, and between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In such a context, the identity with the umma remains as an ideal and aspiration, and the structures of family and local community may become a stronger reality for many Muslims (Nasr 2003, p103).


Early Islam focused on the ideal of Tawhid as a widely conceived 'God-centred civilization' which could be established on earth (Ahmed 2000, I, p74, p89). This also implied a debate on authentic and 'unauthentic' traditions and practices, and a utopian push towards a universal political order based on a unity among believers across diverse cultures and transcending states: -


Islamists furthermore suffer overall from a tendency to seek an idealized social unity, and idealized homogeneous national - or even umma - identity that discourages diversity and difference that is seen as fractious, divisive and harmful to the umma. (Fuller 2003, p19)


Likewise, Muslim communities under pressure within Western countries, e.g. France through 2003-2006, have at times rebounded towards a stronger Islamic identity focused on the ummah, particularly if they remain within minority communities and do not work within the wider French community (Spencer 2005). Islam has emerged as the second largest religion in France, with over 4 million Muslims in the country in the late 1990s and heading towards 10% of the population in the 21st century (see Caldwell 2000; Crittenden & Ferguson 2006), and when compared with the 8-9% of highly active Catholics, this has worried conservative commentators (Hanley 2003, p28). At the broader level, it can also be asked in the post-2001 whether France and Europe as a whole is really willing and able to protect the rights of its Muslim Minorities, in spite of the legal requirement to do so. From 1989 the 'Islamic Scarf' case was concerned with the refusal of a junior high-school principal to allow three Islamic girls to wear scarves in school, basically on the basis of secularism in schools and egality in education, a debate that continued through the 1990s down to 2004 (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12; Wieviorka 1994, p250). The issue of the division between Church and State, laicité (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p140), a core tenant of French republican tradition, was re-iterated through February 2004 with the National Assembly banning all religious symbols in state schools, including headscarves, turbans, skullcaps, and large crosses (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12).


At various time Islamist groups have also sought an internationalised approach through linkages into the wider umma. Thus from 1990 with the formal creation of the 'all-Union' Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) which aimed to create a revival of Islam in Eurasia and Central Asia, with three main structures: the first in Central Asia, plus a Moscow based centre to help Muslims within Russia, and another group based in the North Caucasus. The group soon set up branches in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, aimed at helping propagate Islam and be involved in 'cultural, sociopolitical and economic life'. (Akcali 1998). This organisation, however, had a strongly internationalist orientation, based on the view of a global community of believers (the umma), leading to early contact and cooperation between members in Tajikistan and the mujahidin in Afghanistan. For many Central Asians, the ability of Afghanistan to resist the Soviet invasion during the 1980s, showed it was possible for Islamic communities to resist Russian domination in the 1990s (Akcali 1998), a lesson being partly repeated through the continued resistance of the Taliban parts of southern Afghanistan through 2005-2007. These patterns of local and transnational identity have made it very difficult for the top-down approach of nation-building to be applied in Central Asia, especially if religious and opposition are effectively excluded a political voice (see further Akcali 2003). Likewise, for radical thinkers such as Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) Muslims should constitute a jama'at, a community rather than a nation, and as such 'secularism, nationalism and democracy are the roots of calamities' (Johns & Lahoud 2005, p12). ). More generally, for many Muslims living in troubled states there is a real tension between religious and national identity.


3b. Islamic Views on Trade and Banking


The Islamic tradition has a generally positive view of trade, largely based on the early history of Mohammed’s involvement in the Arabian caravan trade. The view of Mecca as a major trading centre with direct connections onto the incense trade has recently been challenged as invalid since Mecca is not directly on the incense route, and since Mecca itself was only a centre for pilgrimage after the rise of Islam (Crone 1987, p196). This does not reduce the reality of some form of local caravan trade being conducted between Mecca and southern Syria (Crone 1987, pp160-168). Montgomery Watt suggests that in the 7th century Mecca had already established a commercial network, with recorded winter caravans to the Yemen, and summer caravans to Syria, along with relations with Abyssinia (Watt 1988, pp39-44; Qu'ran 106:2). Once Mohammed had established his role as the foremost prophet in Arabia, this meant that both Mecca and Medina in turn became centres for pilgrimage and trade, a trend which continued for over a thousand years (Crone 1987, p172; Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, p225). Pilgrimage and attendant trade in Mecca developed more strongly after the rise of Islam (Crone 1987, pp173-177).


Even though Islamic morality is strongly opposed to usury (Udovitch 1970, pp61-62; see further below), its demand for truth and honesty in contracts, oaths and verbal agreements has meant that it is a religious ethic which aids the role of trade in wealth generation for the community. The hadith tradition itself repeatedly emphasises values such as 'acting justly, trustworthiness, diligence, perseverance, initiative, creativity' (Ghazali 1996, p15). Likewise, good reputation and honest conduct were essential for business activities such as the 'credit partnership', as found in Hanafite law (Udovitch 1970, pp54-55). Therefore, in order to create a just, Islamic economic system, it was necessary for many Islamic values, 'including honesty in business dealings, faithfulness to contracts, and the duty of sharing with others' (Iqbal & Mirakhor 1987, p23) to be internalised individually and enculturated within society as a whole.


Islamic jurisprudence also readily allowed the creation of responsible and flexible business partnerships which facilitated long-distance trading arrangements (Udovitch 1970, p38), probably aiding the success of Muslim traders in long sea voyages into the Indian Ocean and further eastwards (see further Chaudhuri 1990). In particular, this included 'partnership and commenda contracts which were the two basic legal instruments through which these economic functions could be accomplished' (Udovitch 1970, p38; see also Meilink-Roelfofsz 1962, p296). The commenda was particularly useful for investment in such trade:


The commenda is an arrangement in which an investor or group of investors entrusts capital or merchandise to an agent-manager, who is to trade with it, and then return to the investor(s) the principal and a previously agreed share of the profits. As a reward for his labour, the agent receives the remaining share of the profits. Any loss resulting from the exigencies of travel or from an unsuccessful business venture is borne exclusively by the investor(s), the agent is in no way liable for a loss of this nature, losing only his expended time and effort. (Udovitch 1970, p47)


Qurannic principles formed the basis of a virtual 'merchant law' designed to exclude 'unjustified enrichment', and reduce elements of chance in contracts (Udovitch 1970, p40; see further Attia 1986, pp101-102). The fourteenth century thinker Ibn Khaldun (1332-1402) should argue that the most advanced form of sedentary civilisation required mutual trade and cooperation, international trade and economic growth (Mehmet 1990, pp82-83).


Islamic economic systems, including banks, investment houses and insurance companies, are part of a broadly based Islamic revival in many parts of the world, seeking to return Islam to a central social role in modern life (Esposito 1992, p23; Ferguson 1996). Islamic banking is an area where different cultural systems have interacted vigorously. Any Islamic institution must seek to correlate its activities with the basic tenants of Islamic law, but due to the very changed economic environment of the modern era, sustained debate has emerged on appropriate limits of Islamic financial activities.


The main divergence between Islamic and Western economic systems is the rejection of unfair interest in money lending (viewed as Usury, Riba) and an effort to reconcile social justice with the needs of market economies, resulting in various combinations of social intervention and planning alongside market mechanisms (Kandil 1995; Khan & Mirakhor 1990, p353; Preley & Sessions 1994, p585). A concise formulation of the interaction of Islamic conceptions of social justice with the economy has been provided by John Presley and John Sessions: -


Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have equal opportunity and does not imply that they should be equal in poverty or in riches . . . However, it is incumbent on the Islamic state to guarantee a subsistence level to its citizens, that is a minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Quran 2:275-9). The major purpose is to moderate social variances within Islamic society, and to enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life in dignity and contentment. (Presley & Sessions 1994, p585)


No definite agreement has been reached on the difficult problem of whether interest should be banned altogether, a view taken by many Islamic jurists, or whether some sort of low interest rate indexed to inflation (Mehmet 1990) is allowable under Islamic principles. Even within Islamic scholarship opinions vary. In 1995, for example, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheik Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, had suggested that there was little real difference between fixed interest rates of Western banks and the investment schemes offered by Islamic banks, a view not supported by many traditional scholars (Evans 1995). For Muslims the key moral concern with usury is that it often exploits the poor (Haque 1995, p1). As noted by Prof. Bob McKeon at the University of Alberta: 'In static economies, it's extortionary to take any interest from the needy. But in advanced economies, where concentration of capital multiplies productivity, interest is no longer simple usury.' (in Woodward 1995) Usury, Riba, seems to be based on the notion of unfair addition added to a loan in its repayment (Mehmet 1990, p78). There are 20 injunctions against Riba in the Koran, of which 2:275 is extremely clear where it states: 'But God has permitted trading and made usury unlawful' (in Maurer 2005, p55). Ozay Mehmet suggests that it is, 'therefore, open to debate as to whether the Islamic prohibition refers to the interest rate (as the opportunity cost of capital) or usury (as an unjustified extra value in excess of the allowable opportunity cost of capital)' (Mehmet 1990, p78). On the other hand, most Islamic scholars insist that any sort of set interest is forbidden under Shariah, including any indirect advantage or benefits that might be owed to the lender (Nienhause 1986, p3; Afzaal 1997; Nomani & Rahnema 1994, pp1-20). In general terms, the aim seem to be to ensure that both the lender and debtor share risks and uncertainty, and become more equalised in the transaction (Maurer 2005, p56).


Fortunately, a number of financial operations which do not involve interest at all, and which work quite differently from the creation of debt, are open to Islamic banks. These include Murabaha, where the 'bank buys the goods in question from suppliers and delivers them to the customer at an agreed marked-up price', Mudaraba, where money is invested for worthwhile projects in trade and commerce with some of the profits returned to the investors (Inalcik 1994), and the bank receiving a management fee, Musharaka, similar to normal joint ventures, Modaraba, a form of capital trust financing (with the capital protected), and Ijara, similar to leasing.10 Mudaraba, profit sharing, and the business organisations built around the shirka (partnership) were the bases of commercial trade in Muslims societies of the past (Haque 1995, p129). In all these operations, some real service, good, or resource is transacted, i.e. the bank provides some direct business function, and is not simply involved in manipulating paper values. It was through these mechanisms that capital and traders were brought together, sharing a set ratio of the profits of any venture, but not a set rate of return on a principle sum invested. Risk and responsibility was also distributed legally beforehand in these operations, depending on the type of relationship between the different parties (Haque 1995, pp160-162).


In general, Muslim economic principles accept the notion of normal profits and the operation of a generally free market, but are opposed to exploitative practices based on interest, unfair profits, monopolies, oligopolies, hoarding, the sale of future values of crops, and speculation (Mehmet 1990, p77). Certain types of investment, e.g. in brewing or gambling, pork processing industries, or industries associated with pornography prostitution, are also prohibited in Islamic thought, with armaments industries and tobacco sometimes included in this list of prohibitions (Maurer 2005, p62; Mustrull 1996; Mehmet 1990, p77; Allawi 1986, p122). Riba is thus a much wider concept than just set interest on a loan, it includes a wide range of economic activities which are conceived of as unjust, exploitative, or not offering a fair balance between the parties involved in a transaction (Haque 1995, p168). It must be stressed that this condemnation is not just on technical grounds: it is a powerful moral argument that those who 'devour riba' are wicked, greedy and sinful (Haque 1995, p8). From this point of view such persons deserve punishment since they are destroying others and undermining their own communities.


There has sometimes been an unwillingness to see a distinction between interest on loans and shared profits or dividends from investments, but this distinction between interest and shared profit systems is not just a matter of semantics or clever accounting (Maurer 2005, p57; Economist 1993;Ingram 1986, p54; Carlson 1986, p79). Although these criticisms might be valid in some particular cases, there are substantive reasons not to be dismissive of the role of the Islamic economic institutions globally. There are four immediate reasons which suggest that Islamic economic institutions will remain important. Firstly, for Muslims globally, many of whom are seeking to retain the heart of Islamic belief during periods of rapid industrialisation and modernisation, there is in fact a huge global market for a religiously acceptable and culturally compatible form of banking. In the past, some observing Muslims have either had to refuse interest on conventional bank accounts, to donate such interest to a charity, or to rely on investing in stocks directly (Mastrull 1996). Recent estimates suggest that Islamic banks globally have assets of over $60 billion, and are actively involved in infrastructure development, with total financial assets of Islamic Banks and companies in 2005 at $250 billion 'not including Islamic investment funds and insurance' (BNA 2006b; Mardini 1996; Warren 1996; Aziz 1997). Private-sector commercial banks offering these services have greatly expanded since the opening of the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975 (Moore 1990, p235). It has been estimated that there from the mid-1990s some 300 Islamic banks and financial institutions have been operating in 25-40 countries (Mardini 1996; Warren 1996). Islamic banking has grown rapidly recently and although at first mainly located in the Middle East, Africa, South and South-East Asia, this tradition has now spread to North America, Europe, Central Asia (Mardini 1996; Kamaludin 1989; Khalaf 1995, p35; Al Bahar 1996), and Australia.


This growth has meant that even traditional Western banks are willing to open Islamic branches, e.g. in July 1996 Citibank opened such a branch in Bahrain (Citi Islamic Investment Bank), with the Netherlands' largest bank, ABN Amro, following suit later in 1996.11 In the Citibank case, special Sharia boards will oversee investment schemes to ensure they confirm to religious requirements (Warren 1996). Bearing in mind the growth of Islam globally, and the continuing economic development that is occurring in much of the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, this area of banking is likely to continue to grow. Such Islamic assets in the 1990s have been growing on a global basis at 10-15% annually, while total assets for Banks (outside of companies) rose in 2005 from $ 61 to 85 billion, marking a 35% increase rate (BNA 2005b; Khalaf 1995; Straits Times 1996), and are likely to become an important element of the global financial system.


Although US and Canadian institutions are not all fully compliant with Shariah rules, and there has been greater scrutiny of such funds and informal money transfer systems (hawala) since 2001 (Maurer 2005, pp59-60; Abuza 2003; Parker 2006), they have made efforts at accommodating these Islamic markets and funds, including large institutions such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America (Parker 2006). In the past, such informal transfer systems and Islamic aid agencies had be view as transnational conduits for terrorist funding, especially by Al Qaeda in the 1990s (Gunaratna 2002).


In developing countries, of course, there is a possibility that segments of the population remain trapped in real poverty or development lags. These trends suggest that alternative economic systems, which do not reject the notion of social justice as an external economic cost, may have a major role to play in aiding social cohesion and distributed economic development. At the community level, Islamic banks or credit unions can provided a needed source of 'social investment'. Islamic banking can therefore provide a focus for communally-based financial operations. Islamic banking can also provide more affordable ways for ordinary people to buy homes, utilising interest-free credit unions. The scheme is for prospective house buyers to pay into a fund, receiving the entire amount for their house 'when their turn comes up, and keep paying until the fund is reimbursed' (Woodward 1995). Other possible uses for this type of 'social lending' include financing student education (Ingram 1996). Of course, Islamic banks or credit unions would be prohibited from taking over or refinancing existing interest-based debt: they are not a source of 'free money'. At the same time, moreover, interest-free banking of this type could be attractive not just to Muslims, but also to Christians and Jews who strictly follow prohibitions against usury in their own traditions.12


Islamic banking may offer opportunities to specific countries in the South Asian, Asia-Pacific and Afro-Middle Eastern regions. Malaysia in particular, with it developed economic and communication infrastructure, combined with its understanding of Islamic realities, has provided a major service in helping further develop Islamic banking in South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, and the Middle East, and in the developed nations with Islamic populations. Malaysia has had experience with Islamic banks since 1981, and has also been active in the creation of an Islamic insurance company, an Islamic Economic Development Foundation and IKIM, the Institute of Islamic Understanding, and an Islamic University (Camroux 1996). Malaysia has developed a sizeable Islamic banking sector, a true Islamic interbank market, and strong international operations being developed on the island of Labuan, an international offshore financial centre, IOFC (Aziz 1997; Khalaf 1995). There are several opportunities for this international role to be extended. Malaysia was given the brief to develop Islamic banking and insurance within the D8 organisation, a grouping of Islamic states designed to cooperate with each other and act as a parallel organisation to the G8. The D8, launched in June 1997, includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, and aims 'to develop trade, industry and financial projects’ (Butler 1995). Within this organization each country has been given areas for special attention, with Indonesia focusing on human resources, while Malaysia focused 'on privatization, banking and Islamic insurance' (Butler 1997). The Declaration of the D8 stressed the need for development and the eradication of poverty. The group also noted that ‘old policies of double standards, discrimination and oppression have continued and in some cases intensified’ and ‘the insufficient share of our economies in the global trade activities as well as the inadequate role of our countries in the global economic decision-making’ (D8 Declaration 1997). The fifth D8 Summit was held in Bali in 2006, with poverty and energy issues being central issues discussed, with dialogue on 'lowering trade barriers and boosting economic cooperation' and Iran's nuclear program (News Agency Qatar 2006; Radio Australia 2006). Malaysia, with its careful positioning of an important but not dominant role for Islam within its multicultural state, has been well suited to develop Islamic banking in this wider regional context.


The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), founded in Jeddah in 1974 by 37 Islamic countries, and active in some 45 countries or more, has played an active role in 'co-financing projects, trade financing, equity participation, promoting training and research in the fields of Islamic banking and economics' (Altamimi 1986, p31; see also El Helw 1986), using a multilateral approach and Islamic principles. From 2005, the IDB has developed a future vision statement looking toward major poverty reduction in Muslim countries through till 2020 (News Agency Emirate 2005). However, the IDB has taken up a very wide scope of activities, as can be seen by a selected sample of their activities and meetings through 2005-2006, perhaps indicating an over-ambitious agenda.


IDB Events 2005-2006 (modified from http://www.isdb.org/english_docs/idb_home/news.php)


08/07/2006 Moody's Investors' Service Assigns Aaa Long-Term and Prime-1 Issuer Ratings to the Islamic Development Bank

02/07/2006 Workshop on Capacity Building in Facilitation of Trade and Investment

26/06/2006 Workshop on "Capacity Building for Facilitation of Trade and Investment for OIC member countries"

20/06/2006 Speech Delivered by RT Hon Gordon Brown MP, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM Govt., UK, at the Islamic Finance and Trade conference 2006, London

15/06/2006 Chancellor of the Exchequer Announces UK to Become Gateway for Islamic Trade And Finance

29/05/2006 Islamic Development Bank Provides Urgent Relief Assistance to Indonesia for Victims of the Java Earthquake

14/05/2006 Proclamation of the Three Academic Research Institutions and Centres that Won the IDB 1427/2006 Prize for Science and Technology

10/05/2006 IDB support for infrastructure projects in Pakistan

08/05/2006 Proclamation of the Winners of the 1427H/2006 IDB Prize for Women's Contribution to Development

27/04/2006 US$ 36 Million from IDB for University Reconstruction in Indonesia

10/04/2006 IDB Extend US$ 10 million For trade financing operation in favor of Tunisia

09/04/2006 IDB Manages Islamic Financing to Rabigh Refinery & Petrochemical Project in Saudi Arabia

01/04/2006 Yemeni Trade and Industry Minister seeks IDB assistance for joining WTO

25/03/2006 HRH Prince of Wales Endorses the Establishment of Youth Enterprise Programmes in IDB Member Countries .

15/03/2006 IDB Allocates US$ 103 Million for Combating Bird Flu in affected Member Countries

14/03/2006 The Islamic Development Bank Extends US$ 52 Million for Two Development Projects in Lebanon

21/12/2005 The Islamic Development Bank 1440H Vision Commission Finalizes Vision Document

01/10/2005 The Islamic Development Bank conducts a regional vision workshop for member countries in Africa


There have also been efforts to harmonise international Islamic banking, shariah commitments, and international banking rules via a review process, conducted by liaison among groups such as the OIC, and the Bahrain-located Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, AAOIFI (Maurer 2005, p60), the Islamic Financial Services Board,13 and the IDB: -


Approving a product for Islamic banking purposes is a laborious affair that

can take up to two years. Researchers are commissioned to examine a paper on

the subject. This finding is then discussed by up to five members of the Sharia

board supervising the given institution. They will accept, amend or reject the

paper.


The board will then refer it to another Sharia committee who will review it in

conjunction with the person who originally launched the inquiry.


Next a board of 15 scholars, who meet twice a year in Mecca and Medina, will

undertake a further review. The outcome is then reviewed by the entire industry

from bankers to legal bodies across all the Islamic states. . . . (Watts & Gamazo 2006)

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